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COMMENTS
CIVIL PENALTIES AND THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION IMPROVEMENTS ACT
by Neal B. Shniderman
The Federal Trade Commission announced' the initiation of a pilot
program2 to seek civil penalties from anyone who engages in conduct which
violates a prior cease and desist order. Under the program eighty-eight
businesses were notified by letter 3 of the potential $10,000 per violation
penalty for engaging in practices which had been determined to be unfair or
deceptive by prior cease and desist orders. 4 The notified businesses were
not named in the prior Commission orders. Commission authority to seek
these penalties was predicated upon section 205 of the Magnuson-Moss
I. FTC News No. J048-S.205 (Jan. 5, 1976). See also Shifrin, FTC Institutes
New Enforcement Plans, The Washington Post, Jan. 7, 1976, § C, at 7; The Wall Street
Journal, Jan. 6, 1976, at 6, col. 1.
2. The pilot program will address:
(1) business opportunities advertising (misrepresentation of potential
earnings);
(2) advertising of merchandise not readily available for sale, and use of
bait and switch tactics;
(3) false and misleading practices in collecting debts;
(4) selling damaged or defective merchandise without disclosing such
fact, substituting inferior or different goods for those ordered, and
failing to replace or refund monies for defective goods;
(5) selling used or rebuilt merchandise as new;
(6) unfairness or deception in marketing freezer meats;
(7) failure to comply with requirements of the Truth in Lending Act in
consumer credit advertising;
(8) deceptive demonstrations, testimonials, or endorsements; and
(9) false claims for cosmetics and tires.
FTC News, supra note 1.
3. The letters sent by the Commission state:
Dear
On January 4, 1975, the Federal Trade Commission Act was amended
to provide that a person, partnership or corporation is liable for civil penalties of $10,000 per violation for engaging in acts or practices which the
Commission has determined to be deceptive or unfair in prior cease and
desist proceedings. (15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (1) (B)). A copy of the relevant
statutory provision is attached.
This letter together with the enclosed Federal Trade Commission decisions is to inform you of certain [debt collections, sales and advertising,
bait and switch, credit advertising] business opportunities advertising practices [sicl which the Commission has found unlawful under Section 5(a)
(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act and to notify you of the potential liability of a business for civil penalties under the above described
statutory provision if a business is in fact engaged in them.
In order to avert possible action by the Federal Trade Commission you
should immediately insure that you are not engaged in any of the practices proscribed by the enclosed decisions.
Please contact of this office if you have any questions regarding
the applicable law or your possible liability.
4. Among the material included with the letter of warning issued by the Commission is a statement of previously adjudicated Commission determinations upon which a
penalty action will be based. The following is a portion of one statement:
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Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act (FTCIA)5 which
amends section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA).6

7
This Comment will address that portion of section 205 of the FTCIA

which authorizes the Commission to seek civil penalties against persons,
partnerships, or corporations not named as respondents in a Commission
cease and desist order, but who have actual knowledge of Commissionadjudicated law.8 Certain ambiguities in the statutory language which give
rise to the due processs problems of adequate representation, adequate notice,
and the restriction of judicial review are explored, and an attempt is made to
clarify the meaning of the statutory language and to provide solutions for the

due process problems presented.
I.

THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT

Section 5 of the FTCA originally proscribed those activities constituting
"unfair methods of competition."
The United States Supreme Court
initially construed the section 5 prohibition to apply only when the challenged practices were unjust to competitors; consumer exploitation alone was
insufficient. 10 To overcome this rule Congress enacted the Wheeler-Lea
Amendments to the FTCA, 11 through which the phrase "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices" was incorporated into the statutory language. This phrase
SYNOPSIS OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION DECISIONS CONCERNING
THE ADVERTISING AND SALE OF COSMETICS

The Federal Trade Commission has determined that the following acts

or practices in the advertising and sale of cosmetics are deceptive or unfair and are unlawful under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.
It is an unfair or deceptive act or practice to represent, directly or by
implication, that a cosmetic will rejuvenate the skin or will restore youth
or the appearance of youth to the skin. [In re Charles of the Ritz Distrib.
Corp., 34 F.T.C. 1203 (1942), affd, 1944-1945 Trade Cas.
57,267 (2d
Cir. 1944)].
It is an unfair or deceptive act or practice to represent, directly or by
implication, that a cosmetic having no systemic effects will cure, mitigate, treat or prevent a skin condition that is systemically caused. [In
re Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp., 34 F.T.C. 1203 (1942), aft'd, 19441945 Trade Cas. 57,267 (2d Cir. 1944)].
it'is an unfair or deceptive act or practice to represent, directly or by
implication, that any externally applied product will nourish the hair, hair
shaft or hair follicles. [In re Clairol, Inc., 33 F.T.C. 1450 (1941)].
5. Act of Jan. 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, §§ 201-07, 88 Stat. 2194, amending
15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 46, 49, 50, 52, 56, 57, 58 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 46,
49, 50, 52, 56, 57a, 57b, 57c, 58 (Supp. IV, 1974)).
6. Federal Trade Commission Act §§ 1-11, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970), formerly
ch. 311, §§ 1-11, 38 Stat. 717 (1914).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (Supp. IV, 1974); see note 68 infra.
8. This Comment does not analyze the civil penalty provisions provided for in section 205 of the FTCIA, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. IV, 1974), for violation of a rule promulgated by the FTC through a rulemaking proceeding.
9. Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719. The statute provided "[tihat
unfair methods of competition in commerce are hereby declared unlawful." Id.
10. FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304 (1934); FTC v. Raladam Co., 283
U.S. 643 (1931); FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483 (1922).
It. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974). This Act provides:
"Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful." Id. § 45(a) (1).
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was intentionally 12 left undefined by Congress in an attempt to avoid

restricting Commission action unnecessarily. As a result, the Wheeler-Lea
Amendments have tended to promote free competition'1 and to proscribe
14
acts or practices adversely affecting the consumer.
Procedure. The Commission seeks to encourage compliance with the FTCA
through both formal' 5 and informal'" means. Of particular importance
are the consent order and formal adjudication procedures in section 5 of the
FTCA and parts 2 and 3 of the Commission's rules' 7 under which a cease
and desist order may eventuate. When the Commission suspects that a
person, partnership, or corporation is violating the FTCA, an investigation
may be made pursuant to the Commission rules.' 8 During this investigatory
period the party suspected of a violation may be able to negotiate the entry
of a cease and desist order.' 9 While the entry of an order by consent is not
considered an admission of a violation, it has serious consequences. Once
the cease and desist order becomes final 20 the right to a statement of the
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the rights to judicial review or
other challenges to the order, are waived. The agreement submitted to the
Commission by the bureau 2' responsible for the negotiation will be placed, if
accepted, on the public record for sixty days. During this time the Commission will receive any public comments on the proposed order. 22 Only

rarely, however, does the Commission modify the order pursuant to these
23
comments.

12. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239-40 (1972); FTC v. R.F.

Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304, 310-12 (1934); S. Rep. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1819 (1914); ABA SECTION ON ANTITRUST LAW, ANTTRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS 165
(1975). Compare FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920) (providing restrictive interpretation of power), with FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966) (rejecting restrictive interpretation of Gratz).
13. See Toledo Pipe-Threading Mach. Co. v. FTC, 11 F.2d 337, 342-43 (6th Cir.
1926).
14. Korber Hats, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 358, 360 (1st Cir. 1962); National Candy
Co. v. FTC, 104 F.2d 999, 1006 (7th Cir. 1939); see Note, FTC Substantive Rulemaking: An Evaluation of Past Practice and Proposed Legislation, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 135
(1973).
15. See 40 Fed. Reg. 15234 (1975), amending 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-.72 (1975).
See
also notes 3 6-42 infra.
16. If the infraction is minor, the Commission may attempt to obtain an assurance
of voluntary compliance pursuant to 16 C.F.R. § 2.21 (1975); see Note, Voluntary
Compliance: An Adjunct to the Mandatory Process, 38 IND. L. REV. 377 (1963).
In
addition, the Commission may employ rulemaking authority pursuant to section 202 of
the FTCIA, 15 U.S.C. § 57a (Supp. IV, 1974), as implemented by regulations set out
in 3 TRADE REG. REP.
9801.07-.26 (1975), trade practice conferences, industry
guides pursuant to 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.5-.6 (1975), and advisory opinions pursuant to 16
C.F.R. §§ 2.31-.35 (1975), as amended, 40 Fed. Reg. 15235 (1975).
17. 16 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-3.61 (1975).
18. Id. §§ 2.1-.15.
19. 40 Fed. Reg. 15235 (1975), amending 16 C.F.R. § 2.31 (1975).
20. 40 Fed. Reg. 15235-36 (1975), amending 16 C.F.R. § 2.32 (1975). The order resulting from a consent negotiation has the same force and effect as an order entered after a full adjudication on the merits. Id. at 15235; see National Candy Co. v.
FTC, 104 F.2d 999, 1006 (7th Cir. 1939). Cease and desist orders become final pursuant to Federal Trade Commission Act §§ 5(g)-(i), 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(g)-(i) (1970).
21. Organizationally there are two bureaus of importance here-Competition and
Consumer Protection.
22. 40 Fed. Reg. 15236 (1975), amending 16 C.F.R. § 2.34 (1975).
23. MacIntyre & Volhard, Intervention in Agency Adjudications, 58 VA. L REV.
230, 249 (1972). But see Xerox Corp., 3 TRADE REo. REP.
20,728 (FTC 1975)
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Should the proposed cease and desist order not be accepted at the outset
26
25
by the party24 or subsequently by the Commission, formal proceedings
may be initiated if the Commission determines the public interest requires
this action. 27 Absent remand pursuant to rule 3.25(b), 2s the right to enter
into consent negotiations is foreclosed thereafter. 29 Prior to the commencement of formal proceedings there need be no established standards for
deceptive practices"0 since a cease and desist order does not punish previous
practices; 3 ' only future violations of a cease and desist order are punishable.
While the Commission ideally ought not direct a complaint solely against a
minor member of an industry,3 2 a proceeding may be initiated against only
one member of an industry engaging in the alleged illegal practice.38
Without a showing of abuse of discretion,8 4 the respondent may not assert
successfully the defense that he has been placed at a,competitive disadvantage because other members of the industry engaging in the same practice
have not been served or joined.3 5
When formal cease and desist proceedings are brought, the alleged
violator is given an opportunity to rebut the Commission's charges in a
hearing. An opportunity is provided for discovery,3 6 compulsory process for
witnesses,3 7 and the introduction of evidence.3 8 "Every party, except
(withdrawal from adjudication to consider proposed consent order), approval withdrawn, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 20,833 (FTC 1975), renegotiated order accepted, 3:TRADE
REG. REP. 20,868 (FTC 1975), consent order finalized, 3 TRADE REG. REP.
20,955
(FTC 1975).
24. The person, partnership, or corporation subject to the FTCIA and named in a
complaint will be referred to as a party or respondant throughout.
25. After the 60-day publication period, the Commission may withdraw its acceptance of the order during the next 30 days. 40 Fed. Reg. 15236 (1975), amending 16
C.F.R. § 2.34 (1975).
26. The procedure for formal Commission proceedings is set out in the Federal
Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (Supp. IV, 1974), and 40 Fed. Reg.
15234, 33970 (1975), amending 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-.72 (1975).
27. Id. In order to show the commencement of a proceeding was not in the public
interest, an abuse of discretion must be shown. See, e.g., Slough v. FTC, 396 F.2d 870
(Sth Cir. 1968).
28. 40 Fed. Reg. 15236 (1975), formerly 16 C.F.R. § 3.25(b) (1975).
29. 40 Fed. Reg. 15235 (1975), amending 16 C.F.R. § 2.31(b) (1975); see Coro,
Inc. v. FTC, 338 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 954 (1965); Lehigh
Portland Cement Co., 75 F.T.C. 1080 (1969).
30. National Clearance Bureau v. FTC, 255 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1958); see Note, Effective Guidance Through Cease and Desist Orders: The T-V Commercial, 38 IND.
UJ.442, 450 (1963).
31. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952).
32. FTC v. Universal Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244, 251 (1967); Sandura Co., 61
F.T.C. 756 (1962), [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 15,945, modified,
339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964); see Baum & Baker, Enforcement, Voluntary Compliance
and the Federal Trade Commission, 38 IND. L.J. 322, 345 (1963); note 112 infra.
33. National Candy Co. v. FTC, 104 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1939), citing FTC v. R.F.
Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304 (1934), and FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483
(1922).
34. Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958) (per curiam) (no abuse
shown).
35. Coro, Inc. v. FTC, 338 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 954
(1965); Advertising Specialty Nat'l Ass'n v. FTC, 238 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1956); International Art Co. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 393, 397 (7th Cir. 1940).
36. 40 Fed. Reg. 15234, 33970, amending 16 C.F.R. § 3.21 (1975) (pre-hearing
conferences); 16 C.F.R. § 3.22 (motions), 3.31 (request for admissions), 3.33 (depositions) (1975); see ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw, supra note 12, at 219.
37. 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.34-.39 (1975).
38. Id. § 3.43.
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Following a formal hearing
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due notice, the right of cross-examination,
essential to a fair hearing." 39
on the cease and desist order, the decision of
40
becomes the decision of the Commission

41
unless a party perfects an appeal pursuant to the Commission's rules.

When such an appeal is taken to the Commission briefs are filed, oral
argument is heard, and the Commission is authorized to "adopt, modify, or
set aside the findings, conclusions, and rule or order contained in the initial
decision .... "42
Should the Commission render a decision adverse to the respondent,
section 5(c) of the FTCA permits "Ia]ny person, partnership, or corporation required by an order of the Commission to cease and desist from using
43
any . . . act or practice" to appeal to the appropriate court of appeals.
The respondent is required to exhaust his administrative remedies before an
appeal properly lies in the court of appeals 44 except in certain circumstances
when review may be sought in the district court. 45 As in other cases of
judicial review of administrative actions, 46 the Commission's finding of fact,

if supported by substantial evidence, is conclusive despite conflicting evidence which could lead to a different result. 47 The judiciary is, however,
the ultimate arbiter on questions of law; courts must determine whether the
acts or practices which were found by the Commisssion to have occurred are
indeed unfair or deceptive, giving due weight to the Commission's expertise
48
in this area.
Scope and Nature of the Cease and Desist Order. The cease and desist

order, whether entered pursuant to an informal or formal proceeding, may
be viewed as the Commission's most significant weapon. 49 The order is
publicized and serves as notice to others engaged in similar conduct, thereby
39. Id. § 3.41(c); the rights of intervenors are set out in the Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (Supp. IV, 1974), and 16 C.F.R. § 3.14 (1975);
see notes 154-79 infra and accompanying text.
40. 16 C.F.R. § 3.41(a) (1975).
41. Id. §§ 3.42-.55.
42. Id. § 3.54(b).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970). This section designates the appropriate court of appeals to be where the method of competition or act or practice in question was used,
or where the respondent before the Commission resides or carries on business.
44. Miles Laboratories v. FTC, 140 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 752
(1944).
45. Jewel Cos. v. FTC, 432 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1970); Annot., 16 A.L.R. FED. 361
(1973). Generally these instances are limited to when the FTC acts outside the scope
of its authority, when FTC action has international implication, or when the agency fails
to act or takes an unusually long time to act.
46. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act § 101(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970);
Social Security Act § 205, 43 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970); see K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 29.02 (1958).
47. Standard Distribs., Inc. v. FTC, 211 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1954); accord, American
Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1968), modifying final order, 421
F.2d 845 (6th Cir. 1970); cf. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 45(c)
(1970).
48. Grove Laboratories v. FTC, 418 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1969); see St. Joseph Stock
Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 51 (1936).
49. Cf. McKay, Sanctions in Motion: The Administrative Process, 49 IOwA L.
REV. 441, 471 (1964).
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increasing "the in terrorem margin of the administrative agency." 50
In FTC v. National Lead Co."1 the Supreme Court determined that the

Commission has wide discretion regarding the breadth of the cease and desist
order entered when exercising the power granted by the FTCA. 52

This

discretion is not unbridled, however, for the cease and desist order must have
a reasonable relation to the unlawful practice, 53 and must be sufficiently
clear and precise to preclude questions of meaning and application. "4 While
recognizing the reasonable relation doctrine, courts have avoided tying the

Commission's hands.

Although the Commission's findings of fact were

restricted to a particular practice, courts have held cease and desist orders

need not be limited to the specific practice found 5 and have permitted
orders banning general anti-competitive schemes 56 and similar types of ad-

vertising.5 7 The use of orders prohibiting nationwide use of a practice
discovered in only one geographic area has also been sanctioned. 58 Commission orders are not restricted to the prohibition of activity but may
require affirmative action, such as the inclusion in advertising of disclosures
of the limited usefulness of a product in curing or retarding baldness, 59 or the
effectiveness of an iron substitute in alleviating fatigue. 60
II.

CIVIL PENALTIES

The enforcement process under section 5 of the FTCA as originally
50. Cf. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 317 (1965); Note,
supra note 30, at 449-50.
51. 352 U.S. 419 (1957).
52. Id. at 428; see Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946).
53. 352 U.S. at 428. In FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 217 (1933), the
Court stated, "The orders should go no further than is reasonably necessary to correct
the evil and preserve the rights of competitors and public." See Niresk Indus., Inc. v.
FTC, 278 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1960).
54. American Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.2d 232, 237 (6th Cir. 1968), modifying final order, 421 F.2d 845 (6th Cir. 1970); William H. Rorer, Inc. v. FTC, 374
F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1967), overruled on other grounds, Rabriner & Jontow, Inc. v. FTC,
386 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1967); see FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 368 U.S. 360, 367-68
(1962) (dictum). But see FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 394 (1965)
(permitting respondents to seek advisory opinions to clarify Commission orders).
55. FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 368 U.S. 360 (1962); FTC v. Mandel Bros., 359
U.S. 385, 392-93 n.7 (1959); FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952); Slough
v. FTC, 396 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 980 (1968); see Note, supra
note 16, at 384.
56. Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
908 (1967).
57. Nirisk Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 337, 343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
883 (1960).
58. Cf. Grove Laboratories v. FTC, 418 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1969); National Dairy
Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 517 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 977 (1968); see
Note, supra note 16, at 384. In addition, the cessation of a particular practice does not
preclude the issuance of a cease and desist order if the practice is capable of being resumed. Coro, Inc. v. FTC, 338 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 954
(1965); Marlene's, Inc. v. FTC, 216 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1954); Hershey Chocolate
Corp. v. FTC, 121 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1941). In National Lead Co. v. FTC, 227 F.2d
825 (7th Cir. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 352 U.S. 419 (1957), and Bell & Howell
Co., 54 F.T.C. 108 (1957), the issuance of a cease and desist order was not allowed
because circumstances precluded resumption of the activity.
59. See, e.g., Ward Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d 952 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 827 (1960). See generally Note, Corrective Advertising and the FTC: No
Virginia, Wonder Bread Doesn't Help Build Strong Bodies Twelve Ways, 70 MICH. L.
REV. 374 (1971).
60. See, e.g., J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967).
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enacted6 1 required the Commission to enter a cease and desist order against
the respondent which would lead first to the issuance of an appellate
enforcement order upon a showing that the respondent had violated the
order, and finally to a penalty in the form of a contempt citation, should the
enforcement order be violated. The Wheeler-Lea Amendments 2 to the
FTCA altered the enforcement procedure by eliminating the need for an
appellate enforcement order before permitting commencement of a penalty
action for breach of a final order. 63 The defendant in such a civil penalty
proceeding was liable to the extent of "not more than $5,000 for each
violation ....
-64 This provision, however, has been amended twice. The
first made each day of a "continuing failure or neglect to obey a final order
of the Commission . . . a separate offense."'6 5 The second amendment
increased the maximum penalty from $5,000 to $10,000 per violation, and
empowered district courts to grant injunctive and other equitable relief to
enforce a final order. 66
67
Section 5(m) of the FTCA was replaced by section 205 of the FICIA.
The new statutory language, designated section 5(m) of the FTCA, 68
should not alter the courts' authority to assess civil penalties for a violation of
a cease and desist order against the named respondent. Since the respondent in a Commission proceeding has actual knowledge of the order, no
further notice is required prior to the initiation of a civil penalty proceeding
in federal district court. 69 Once a civil suit to recover the penalties is
61. Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719.
62. Federal Trade Commission Act H§ 41-58 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).

63. 15 U.S.C. §H 45(g)-(i) (1970). The cease and desist order becomes final
when the respondent fails to pursue his rights to appeal or when the courts rule against
the respondent.
64. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(1), 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (1970), as amended,
(Supp. IV, 1974).

65. Oleomargarine Tax Act, ch. 61, § 4(c), 64 Stat. 21 (1950), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 45(l) (1970).
66. Trans-Alaskan Pipeline Authorization Act, 87 Stat. 591 (1973), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 45(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
67. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(m), 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (Supp. IV, 1974),
formerly ch. 311, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 64 Stat. 21 (1950), as amended,
87 Stat. 592 (1973).
68. Section 5(m) now states in relevant part:
[1] (B) If the Commission determines in a proceeding under subsection
(b) of this section that any act or practice is unfair or deceptive, and issues a final cease and desist order with respect to such act or practice,
then the Commission may commence a civil action to obtain a civil penalty in a district court of the United States against any person, partnership, or corporation which engages in such act or practice(1) after such cease and desist order becomes final (whether or not
such person, partnership, or corporation was subject to such cease and
desist order), and (2) with actual knowledge that such act or practice
is unfair or deceptive and is unlawful under subsection (a) (1) of this
section.
In such action, such person, partnership, or corporation shall be liable for
a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation.
(2)" if the cease and desist order establishing that the act or practice
is unfair or deceptive was not issued against the defendant in a civil
penalty action under paragraph (1)(B) the issues of fact in such action
against such defendant shall be tried de novo.
15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (Supp. IV, 1974).
69. United States v. Beatrice Foods Co., 493 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 961 (1975).
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commenced, a court or jury will determine if the party has violated the
order. 70 The scope of the district court's inquiry, however, will be restricted
to a determination of compliance with the order, 71 and not whether the order
is valid. 72 If the courts in an enforcement proceeding were required to review
the facts supporting the order and the conclusion that these facts constitute
an unfair or deceptive practice, the effective administration of the FTCA
would be frustrated. 73 Such frustration would be inevitable since the courts,
lacking the fact finding expertise of the Commission, would traverse the
ground already covered by the Commission, thereby delaying the implementation of appropriate orders and enforcement of the Act.
The most significant change in civil penalty proceedings will result from
the new sections 5(m)(1) and 5(m)(2) of the FTCA.74 Under section
5(m)(1)(B)(1) the Commission may bring an action in federal district
court to recover civil penalties up to $10,000 per violation. The action may
be brought against any person, partnership, or corporation engaging in an act
or practice prohibited by a final cease and desist order 75' "with actual
knowledge that such practice is unfair or deceptive and unlawful under
[section 5(a) (1)],"76 irrespective of whether the defendant is named in the
cease and desist order in question. If the party proceeded against was not
actually subject to the order involved, section 5(m)(2) provides that "the
' '77
issues of fact in such action against such defendant shall be tried de novo.
Stated simply, the Commission may obtain a cease and desist order against
the ABC Corporation for engaging in a particular type of advertising. Since
Commission orders may be broadly worded, 78 the Commission could invoke
these provisions against either IBM or Ma and Pa's Grocery Stores for
engaging in advertising similar to that prohibited by the order against ABC
Corporation. Proof of actual knowledge can be obtained easily. If the
Commission upon its own initiative or the receipt of a complaint from a
consumer or competitor decides to act against Ma and Pa, a copy of the
order entered against ABC Corporation could be served on Ma and Pa by a
procedure similar to section 5(f) of the FTCA.7 9 Naturally, Ma and Pa
70. United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 1974-1 Trade Cas. 75,041 (2d Cir. 1974);
69,601 (S.D.N.Y. 1959);
United States v. Home Diathermy Co., 1960 Trade Cas.
United States v. Purofied Down Prod. Corp., 1956 Trade Cas., T 68,353 (E.D.N.Y.
69,656 (D.N.J. 1960). But
1956); see United States v. Hindman, 1960 Trade Cas.
see United States v. Vulcanized Rubber & Plastics Co., 288 F.2d 257, 258-59 n.2 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961) (dictum).
71. Questions of intent, good faith, and extent of the injury resulting are not relevant to the determination of liability for violating the order, but are appropriate in the
70,950 (S.D.N.Y.
mitigation of penalty. United States v. Karns, 1963 Trade Cas.
1963); United States v. Vitasafe Corp., 212 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
72. United States v. H.M. Prince Textiles, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
70,478, at 76,957 (W.D. Pa.
United States v. Wilson Chem. Co., 1962 Trade Cas.
1962), citing Piuma v. United States, 126 F.2d 601 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
57,206 at
637 (1942); see Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 1944-1945 Trade Cas.
57,223 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
73. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 54 (1948).
74. Act of Jan. 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 205(a), 88 Stat. 2201, amending
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(m)(1), 45(m)(2) (Supp. IV,
1974)); see note 55 supra.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
Id. § 45(m)(2); see Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
See notes 49-60 supra and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970). The FTC appears to agree with this suggestion. In
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would then have notice and would be liable to pay penalties for continuing to
engage in the prohibited practices after receipt of such notice.80
There can be little doubt Commission Chairman Engman was correct in
asserting that these amendments "will change the entire thrust of consumer
protection law enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission." '
Prior to
the enactment of the FTCIA each party was entitled to take two bites of the
apple: each potential respondent could engage in a practice without suffering
a penalty until a proceeding was filed and a final cease and desist order was
issued; later each would incur a penalty only after enforcement proceedings
were initiated.8 2 Only one party is currently entitled to two bites. Once an
order is obtained everyone else with actual knowledge of the order becomes
liable for civil penalties after only one period of participation in unlawful
trade practices.
Whether or not the FTCIA eliminates the opportunity to take a second
bite is dependent upon the interpretation given to the statutory language
which states that "the issues of fact in such action against such defendant
shall be tried de novo. ' '83 Is this to be interpreted restrictively so that the
district court in a civil penalty proceeding against a non-party to the cease
and desist order will determine only (1) whether the defendant acted as
alleged, and (2) whether the alleged acts violated the previous cease and
desist order? If so, the trial court is barred from examining the conclusion
84
of law reached by the Commission that such acts are unfair and deceptive,
although, upon determining that violations have occurred, the amount of the
civil penalty may be determined by the court. Alternatively, under a
permissive interpretation this language may mean that the district court
proceeding will be substituted for the administrative process. The court
would judge the facts (what acts were performed), draw its own conclusions
of law (whether the act or practice is unfair or deceptive), and assess a
penalty.
Although sparse, the legislative history8 5 suggests Congress intended the
"restrictive" interpretation. First, the statements in the conference report
his opinion dissenting from the initiation of the pilot program, Commissioner Nye discussed the notification sent to the selected businesses:
Thus, in subsequent civil penalty proceedings, there should be little room

for argument that those in receipt of the Commission's notice did not have
the 'actual knowledge' required by the Act that the acts or practices involved are prohibited by Section 5(a) ( 1).

In re Implementation of Section 205 Enforcement Program 2-3 (FTC, Jan. 5, 1976)
(Nye, Comm'r, dissenting). However, Commissioner Nye properly notes that receipt
of notice is not "a condition precedent to the imposition of civil penalties, inasmuch as
the statutory test is 'actual knowledge,' however acquired." Id. at 5; see note 1 supra.
80. See Note, supra note 30.

81. Address by Lewis A. Engman, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, before the Section of Antitrust Law of the ABA, Washington D.C., April 11, 1975, reprinted in ANTTRUST & TRADE REG. REP., Apr. 15, 1975, at D-1.

82. While the respondent may engage in the unlawful practice after a cease and desist order has been issued, he is subject to the assessment of a penalty for such practices.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974); see notes 68, 77 supra.
84. See notes 43-48, 55-58 supra and accompanying text.
85. See S. 356, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 202 (1973):

The Commission may initiate civil actions in the district courts of the
United States against persons, partnerships, or corporations engaged in
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address only questions of fact and not conclusions of law.8 6 Second, when
discussing the conference committee version, Representative Broyhill stated,
"I might add, of course, that these persons [who were not respondents in a
Commission proceeding] will be entitled to their day in court before being
assessed with penalties, and for that reason are granted a de novo trial on all
factual issues in the penalty action. 87 Nothing was said concerning the
ability of the district court to review the conclusion of law reached by the
Commission. Third, the denial of the right to challenge the conclusion of
law in an enforcement proceeding under the new amendments is carried over
from the previous law.8 8 Finally, the purpose of the FTCIA, which
includes the new provisions, is apparently to provide a greater degree of
protection for the consumer by speeding up a determination that a practice is
unfair or deceptive.8 9 There are indications that the Commission accepts
the restrictive interpretation. 9
To interpret the statute as precluding the district court from reviewing the
conclusion of law that a particular act or practice is unfair or deceptive may
give rise to several due process problems. Although these problems may not
be insurmountable, the presence of such due process considerations seems to
be the most significant justification for an interpretation permitting full
review of law and fact by the district court.
III.

PROBLEMS OF DUE PROCESS AND THE FTCIA

Three due process problems arise by interpreting the FTCIA to preclude
the district court from reviewing conclusions of law contained in a previously
entered cease and desist order during a civil penalty proceeding initiated
against persons who were non-parties in the previous Commission proceedany act or practice which is unfair or deceptive to a consumer and is prohibited by subsection [5] (a)( 1) of this section with actual knowledge or
knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances that such
act is unfair or deceptive and is prohibited by subsection [5] (a)(1) of
this section, to obtain a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each
such violation.
This version of the civil penalty section provides a much "cleaner" approach to assessing
civil penalties than the enacted version. Previous Commission orders would have been
only an objective circumstance showing intent to violate the Act. In addition, the district court would provide a trial de novo rendering its own findings of fact and conclusions of law in each penalty suit initiated, rather than using the Commission's conclusions of law as the enacted version suggests. Therefore, under the Senate version previous orders appear not to be conclusive presumptions, but merely evidentiary. H.R. 7917,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
86. H.R. REP. No. 93-1606, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1974):
The conference substitute adds a new provision clarifying that where a
defendant in such an action was not subject to a cease and desist order,
the issues of fact shall be tried de novo in the district court. Of course,
where the defendant was the subject of a final cease and desist order regarding such acts or practices by the Commission, the determination of
the Commission as to the facts would normally be conclusive if supported
by substantial evidence.
See notes 69-73 supra and accompanying text. The substantial evidence rule would be
applied in the court of appeals when the order was originally challenged, or in a consent
proceeding this determination would be waived. See notes 20, 42-47 supra and accompanying text.
87. 120 CoNo. REc. H12349 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1974) (emphasis supplied).
88. See notes 69-73 supra and accompanying text.
89. The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 6, 1976, at 8, col. 1.
90. See Engman Address, supra note 81.
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ing: the adequacy of representation, the adequacy of notice, and the ability
of Congress to restrict judicial review. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provides insight into the adequacy of representation and notice
since a Commission cease and desist order issued against one party will be
used against others. The order thereby creates an action in the nature of a
defendants' class action. The respondent in the original cease and desist
order proceeding has the right to obtain judicial review of the validity of the
order in the court of appeals. Once the order becomes final and is
employed in a civil penalty suit against those who were not parties to the
earlier Commission proceeding, the non-parties' interest in having the order
declared invalid overlaps the interests of the named respondent, although
non-parties may have had no notice or opportunity to be heard in the prior
proceeding. Since only the named respondent can challenge the Commission's conclusions of law in the original proceeding, and the defendant's
opportunity to challenge these conclusions in a civil penalty action is
foreclosed by the statute, the previous efforts of the named respondent were
dispositive of the non-parties' interests. Hence, a group akin to a defendants' class is formed and the decision becomes binding on this group in the
same manner as a class action would operate.
Collateral Estoppel. The result achieved under the restrictive interpretation
of the FTCIA may also be analogized to the use of collateral estoppel. 91 In
proceeding I, an administrative cease and desist order proceeding, 92 the
FTC obtained a final cease and desist order9 3 against party I. In proceeding II, a civil penalty action under the FTCIA against party II, the FTC
will allege that party II is collaterally estopped from challenging the issue of
the legality of the cease and desist order issued against party I, since that
issue was essential to the prior determination and actually litigated in the
94
prior proceeding.
91. One definition for collateral estoppel states:
Where there is a second action between parties, or their privies, who are
bound by a judgment rendered in a prior suit, but the second action involves a different claim, cause, or demand, the judgment in the first suit
operates as a collateral estoppel as to, but only as to, those matters or
points which were in issue or controverted and upon the determination of
which the initial judgment necessarily depended.
1B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.441[21, at 3777 (2d ed. 1974).
92. This "proceeding" may be a consent proceeding or an administrative adjudicative proceeding resulting in a final cease and desist order. See notes 15-48 supra and
accompanying text. See also note 94 infra.
93. See note 63 supra.
94. See, e.g., Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876). Using the theory
of collateral estoppel to explain the procedure prescribed by the FTCIA may be acceptable when the prior cease and desist order resulted from litigation. Serious questions
arise, however, over the viability of using cease and desist orders entered by consent as
the basis for collaterally estopping a defendant in a civil penalty proceeding. Professor
Moore notes that the use of consent judgments as a basis for collateral estoppel has
evoked mixed reaction by the courts. 1B J. MOORE, supra note 91, 0.444[3], at 4009,
citing James, Consent ludgments as Collateral Estoppel, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1959).
Moreover, the general federal rule appears to be that a consent judgment cannot predicate the inference that findings were formulated on any issues. Id. at 4018. Therefore,
if the courts are willing to accept the collateral estoppel analogy to the FTCIA, the use
of consent cease and desist orders may not be accepted. The class action analogy, however, does not appear to be subject to the same objection.
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While application of collateral estoppel by a single plaintiff against
numerous defendants is not typical, 95 situations have arisen where the
plaintiff in suit I asserts collateral estoppel in suit II against a stranger to the
first suit. 0 6 Professor Vestal suggests these cases may be classified according

to several rationales: privity, muniments of title, and, theoretically, when the
interests of the defendant in suit II were adequately represented by the

defendant in suit

7
1.9

He considers the "classic" example of the privity

rationale to be the transfer by defendant I of his interest by sale or
assignment after the commencement of suit 1.98 If defendant I loses, his
assignee (vendee) is precluded from defending in a subsequent suit against
the matter previously settled.19
A second rationale, "muniments of title,"'100 is suggested and exemplified
1 1
' a suit
by the decision in Perkins v. Benquet Consolidated Mining Co.,
concerning the title to stock. In suit I the husband sued his estranged wife
for title and possession of certain securities. Having defeated her husband's
claim in suit I, the wife filed suit against the issuing corporation for dividends
improperly paid to her husband and for the reissuance of stock certificates in
her name. The court concluded that the defendant corporation, although a

stranger to suit 1, was collaterally estopped from denying the wife's right to
10 2
the dividends and certificates.
95. See Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel By a Nonparty, 35 GEO.WASH. L REv. 1010, 1032 (1967).
96. Vestal, Preclusion/ResJudicata Variables: Parties,50 IOwA L. REv. 27 (1964).
97. Id. at 60.
98. Id. at 60-61.
99. Id. at 61, citing, inter alia, United States v. New York Terminal Warehouse
Co., 233 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1956); accord Seguros Tepeyac, S.A., Compania Mexicana
de Seguros Generales v. Jerigan, 410 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1969); Merchants Corp. of
America v. 9655 Long Tons, No. 2 Yellow Milo, 238 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Tex. 1965).
See also Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion: Expansion, 47 So. CAL. L. REV. 357, 366-67
(1974), citing Procter & Gamble Co. v. Byers Transp. Co., 355 F. Supp. 547 (W.D.
Mo. 1973).
This same rationale is applicable to lessor and lessee, mortgagor and mortgagee, governmental agencies, guardian and ward, corporation and stockholder, bankrupt and trustee, and decedents and successors in interest. Vestal, supra note 96, at 61, citing, inter
alia, Kruger & Burch, Inc. v. Du Boyce, 241 F.2d 849 (3d Cir. 1957) (lessor-lessee);
Dumitt v. Jefferson County, 300 Ky. 514, 189 S.W.2d 602 (1945) (government agencies); Frederick v. First Liquidating Corp., 317 Mich. 637, 27 N.W.2d 117, cert. denied,
332 U.S. 772 (1947) (guardian-ward); Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Central Republic
Trust Co., 128 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1942) (corporation-stockholder); Detroit Trust Co.
v. Schantz, 14 F.2d 225 (E.D. Mich. 1926) (bankrupt-trustee); Lesser v. Migden, 328
F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1964) (decedent-successor in interest).
However, the courts have failed to find a sufficiently close relationship to warrant the
conclusion that privity existed between co-tenants, tenants in common, husband and
wife, master and servant, parent and child, partners, and joint tortfeasors. Vestal, supra
note 96, at 61, citing, inter alia, Robinson v. Seales, 243 S.W. 649 (Tex. Civ. App.Galveston 1922, no writ) (cotenants); Glover v. McFaddin, 99 F. Supp. 385 (E.D. Tex.
1951), a/I'd, 205 F.2d 1, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 900 (1953) (tenants in common); Fleming v. Cooper, 225 Ark. 634, 284 S.W.2d 857 (1956) (husband and wife); Deorosan
v. Haslett Warehouse Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 599, 332 P.2d 422 (1958) (master-servant);
Sayre v. Crews, 184 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1950) (parent-child); McLelland v. Ridgeway,
12 Ala. 482 (1847) (partners); Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting
Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912) (joint tortfeasors).
100. Vestal, supra note 96, at 64.
101. 55 Cal. App. 2d 720, 132 P.2d 70 (1942).
102. Professor Vestal suggests the decision in Perkins may also be explained on the
basis of privity between the husband and the corporation, or because the corporation's
claim was a derivative of the husband's claim. Vestal, supra note 96, at 65.
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The final rationale posited, which is theoretical, bases an offensive use of
collateral estoppel upon the adequate representation of the defendant in suit
04
II by the defendant in suit I.103 The only case cited for this proposition'
is a condemnation action where the court held the estoppel argument did not
require resolution and a decision was rendered on alternate grounds. 105
Absent a showing by the Commission that the defendant in the civil
penalty proceeding under the FTCIA was sufficiently related to the respondent in the cease and desist order proceeding to warrant a finding of privity,
only the theory of adequate representation would appear to permit the
offensive use of collateral estoppel. This theory is not without pitfalls. First,
the theory of adequate representation is subject to the arguments raised
below concerning the analogy of the FTCIA to a defendant's class action. 0 6
Second, while not specifically addressing this point, the United States
Supreme Court has suggested 0 7 that the offensive use of collateral estoppel
against a stranger to the first suit cannot be squared with the due process
08
clause.'

Because the analogy between the FTCIA and the offensive use of
collateral estoppel presents an atypical type of estoppel, only the theory of

adequate representation would appear to justify the use of collateral estoppel. The argument that collateral estoppel justifies the procedure authorized
under the FTCIA, therefore, adds nothing in support of the Commission's
position since the analogy to a defendants' class is also dependent upon the
same principle: they will sink or swim together. But the collateral estoppel
argument does raise questions. Assuming the courts sustain the restrictive
interpretation of the FTCIA, will the courts sustain the defensive use of
collateral estoppel in the subsequent civil penalty or other proceeding? Will
the courts also sustain its use in the administrative process should the

Commission or any other agency with concurrent jurisdiction lose its bid to
obtain a final cease and desist order or civil penalties? 109
Adequacy of Representation. A threshold issue under federal rule 23110 is
103. Id. at 65-66. See Vestal, supra note 99, at 370-71.

104. United States v. An Article Labled in Part "The Ellis Micro-Dynameter," Libel

No. 54 of 1962 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (opinion by Judge Luongo) (unreported).
105. Vestal, supra note 96, at 66.
106. See notes 110-31 infra and accompanying text.

107. The Court stated:

Some litigants-those who never appeared in a prior action-may not be

collaterally estopped without litigating the issue. They have never had a
chance to present their evidence and arguments on the claim.

Due proc-

ess prohibits estopping them despite one or more existing adjudications of
the identical issue which stand squarely against their position.

Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329
(1971)

(dictum), citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).

108. U.S. CoNsT. amends. V, XIV.
109. For discussions on the defensive use of collateral estoppel see Currie, Civil Pro-

cedure: The Tempest Brews, 53! CAL. L. REV. 25 (1965); Currie, Mutuality of Collateral
Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281 (1957); Vestal, supra

notes 96, 99; Note, supra note 95; Note, Res Judicata and Administrative Jurisdiction-

A Proposal for Resolving Conflicts Between Agencies with Overlapping Jurisdiction, 35
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1056 (1967); Note, Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties, 87 HARV.

L. REV. 1485 (1974). See also Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 1044 (1970).
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
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whether the named party adequately represents in a constitutional sense
those individuals who will be bound by the decision. This same question
must be asked under the FTCIA procedure because the conduct of the
named respondent will determine the rights in a later civil penalty action of
those who are non-parties to the proceeding. As in federal class action
practice, in order for prospective parties to have adequate representation the
interests of the respondent in a cease and desist proceeding may not be
antagonistic to those of the described class. Even if the interests are not
antagonistic, representation is not adequate unless the interests are coextensive with future defendants' interests."'
The interests of the respondent and potential defendants may not be
coextensive if a small corporation in an industry which follows similar
practices throughout is singled out for the issuance of a proposed complaint. 112 The respondent will not always desire to litigate the issue and
may indeed lack the resources to do so.11 As a result, the relatively weak
respondent will enter into a consent order without fairly litigating the
issue of whether the alleged acts are deceptive or unfair. While the
respondent need not admit a violation, the consent order has the same effect
and finality as an adjudicated order. 1 4 Other individuals engaged in
identical or similar acts or practices, therefore, will be bound in spite of an
inability to protect their own interests. To give effect to the consent order in
a civil penalty proceeding in this situation would seem to violate due
process. 11
Even if the Commission issues a proposed complaint against a major
enterprise with substantial resources and highly skilled counsel, adequate
representation may be precluded by conflicts of interest among members of
an industry. Diverse and potentially conflicting interests within the class are
incompatible with adequate representation and need not be related to the
issues raised in the suit." 6 Since a cease and desist order can be quite
broad despite a finding of fact restricted to a particular practice, 1 7 conflicts
of interest may arise as a result of each class member's desire to obtain to its
benefit limiting modifications of the order. Each member of the class is
likely to be engaged in similar but distinctive practices. Consequently, the
111.

P.W. Husserl, Inc. v. Newman, 25 F.R.D. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); accord, Lynch

v. Sperry Rand Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
112. Two commentators cite a statement in the Wall Street Journal, Jan. 20, 1975,
at 12, col. 4, that the Commission has under consideration obtaining a cease and desist
order against a small company and using that order "to whipsaw the big boys into line."

Kintner & Smith, The Emergence of the Federal Trade Commission as a Formidable
Consumer Protection Agency, 26 'MERCER L. REV. 651, 682 (1975).

The only way to

accomplish this is through the restrictive interpretation. See Engman Address, supra
note 81.
113. See P.D.Q., Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 61 F.R.D. 372 (S.D. Fla.
1973).
114. See notes 18-20 supra and accompanying text.
115. See Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973); Buchholtz v. Swift &
Co., 62 F.R.D. 581 (D. Minn. 1973); Thomas v. Clarke, 54 F.R.D. 245 (D. Minn.

1971), citing Herbert v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), and Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); note 118 infra.
116. du Pont v. Wyly, 61 F.R.D. 615 (D. Del. 1973). One instance of such conflict
occurs when members of the class are involved in other litigation as adversaries.
117.

See notes 49-60 supra and accompanying text.
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individual non-parties' interests in pursuing the modification will differ and
may diverge from the interests of the named respondent.

Under due process

principles which have been applied to defendants' class actions the Constitution would seem to preclude in such a case the binding effect of the cease
and desist order on parties with interests different from the named respondent.11
Adequacy of Notice. The general principles of due process prohibit a
binding adjudication of the rights of parties not before the court. 119 Because class action litigation is an exception to these principles, and due to its

"formidable, if not irretrievable, effect on substantive rights," special care
must be taken to comply with the spirit and letter of procedural safeguards. 1 20 The absentee member of a class of defendants upon whom the
121
present litigation will be binding need not be named or joined formally,
but the Constitution requires that an opportunity must be made to provide
"notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
1 22
present their objections."'

If the courts accept the statutory interpretation precluding judicial review
of the Commission's conclusions of law in civil penalty actions, the require-

ments of adequate notice for class action litigation appear by analogy to be
applicable to the FTCIA. This is particularly true if the district courts are

precluded as well from reviewing the Commission order in a subsequent
declaratory judgment action brought by the non-party potential defendant.'

23

118. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). Commissioner Nye, dissenting
from the initiation of the pilot program, may have been concerned with the due process
rights of non-parties when he stated the Commission should not have used the unappealed orders of an Administrative Law Judge, which the Commission itself refuses to
consider binding precedent, in the notices sent to the selected businesses. In re Implementation of Section 205 Enforcement Program (FTC, Jan. 5, 1976) (Nye, Comm'r,
dissenting). Commissioner Nye concedes that in the normal course of events there is
no need for the Commission to review "sua sponte, unappealed initial decisions of the
administrative law judge." Id. at 3. However, he does not think predicating a civil penalty proceeding against persons not in "any way involved" in the earlier proceeding before the Commission is appropriate for three reasons. First, he has doubts as to the
constitutionality of delegating to administrative law judges the power to make rules governing unfair and deceptive trade practices, a power which has been delegated from
Congress to the Commission. Id. at 4. Second, among the previous unreviewed decisions of the Commission there are bound to be incorrect statements of law for which
the informal review by the Commission staff, in an attempt to weed out these statements, cannot constitute a Commission determination in an adjudicative proceeding
within the statutory requirements. Id. at 4-5. Third, Commissioner Nye finds it
"anomolous" that the Commission will permit civil penalty actions under the new section 5(m) of the FTCA to be based on a decision which the Commission deems to "become effective" and not which is "adopted and issued as the decision of the Commission." Id. at 5. The Commission has drawn this distinction to avoid the conclusion
that an unappealed decision carries "the precedential weight of stare decisis." Id.
119. Yazzie v. Morton, 59 F.R.D. 377 (D. Ariz. 1973), citing National Licorice Co.
v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940).
120. Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 831 (3d Cir. 1973).
121. S.S. Kresge Co. v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1225, 1232 (6th Cir. 1969).
122. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); accord, Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115 (1956); Greenfield v. Villager
Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 831 (3d Cir. 1973); Wagner v. Little Rock School Dist., 373
F. Supp. 876 (E.D. Ark. 1973).
123. See notes 199-206 infra and accompanying text.
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The form and nature of the notice may present a variety of difficulties
since "a mere gesture" of notice would be insufficient under class action
principles. 124 Clearly, if the Commission is aware of the individuals or
enterprises who are engaged in a particular practice which it seeks to
eliminate, personal notice of the Commisssion proceeding rather than notice
by publication should be required. 1 25 For those individuals or corporations
engaging in a particular act or practice without the Commission's knowledge,
notice by publication in the Federal Register, trade publications, and other
journals or publications likely to acquaint the business man with the
pendency of the action would apparently suffice.
Since there are indications that the Commission intends to utilize determinations made in consent orders, 1 26 notice would have to be given before the
actual negotiations commence in order to provide prospective defendants
with an adequate opportunity to act. Should the Commission decide to
forego the use of consent orders in applying the FTCIA, then timely notice
should be required once a decision is made to initiate a formal proceeding.
An analogy may be drawn between the binding effect of injunctions and
cease and desist orders on others than the named parties. A cease and
desist order, like an injunction, 27 is issued on the basis of in personam
jurisdiction. 1 28 Generally these two orders function in a similar manner;
each commands a person, partnership, or corporation to cease 1 29 acting in a
particular fashion. The history of injunctive actions and the well developed
body of the law in this area indicate that courts may not enjoin the whole
world.' 30 Generally, an injunction limits only the parties-defendant, those
in privity with them, those represented by them, and those individuals
subject to their control.' 3 ' In the context of the FTCIA a cease and desist
order should be similarly restricted because of the failure to provide adequate notice and representation.
Restriction of Judicial Review. The restrictive interpretation of the FTCIA
denies the district court the ability to review in a civil penalty suit the
conclusions of law reached by the Commission.' 32 A question arises
whether a grant of jurisdiction over a particular subject made to a federal
124. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
125. Id. at 319-20; Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) (II),
479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973) (III), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
Undoubtedly, service of notice would be sufficient if the Commission complied with the
Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(f), 15 U.S.C. § 45(f) (1970).
126. Engman Address, supra note 81.
127. See, e.g., Chase Nat'l Bank v. Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431 (1934).
128. See, e.g., California Lumberman's Council v. FTC, 115 F.2d 178 (9th Cir.
1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 709 (1941).
129. While it is true that in most instances both orders are prohibitory, affirmative
acts may occasionally be required. See notes 59-60 supra and accompanying text.
130. Kean v. Bailey, 82 F. Supp. 260 (D. Minn. 1949), aff'd sub nom. Kean v. Hurley, 179 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1950); accord, Wright v. County School Bd., 309 F. Supp.
671, 676-77 (D. Va. 1970), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Wright v. Council of City
of Emporia, 442 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 407 U.S. 451 (1972). See C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2956 (1973).
131. Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9 (1945); see Sebrone Co. v. FTC, 135
F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1943).
132. See notes 69-73, 78 supra and accompanying text.
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district court with a restriction on the court's scope of inquiry is consistent
with the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The decisions by the
4
Supreme Court in Yakus v. United States133 and Bowles v. Willingham"1
suggest an answer to this question.
During World War II Congress, as a temporary measure, enacted the
Emergency Price Control Act 3 5 to establish a comprehensive scheme for
controlling the prices of commodities and rents. As part of this legislation
the Emergency Court of Appeals was created with exclusive jurisdiction to
review the validity of regulations and orders issued pursuant to the Act. 13 6
During enforcement proceedings which were either criminal, equitable, or
civil in nature the district court's inquiry was statutorily restricted solely to
the question of compliance with the Act and regulations and orders issued
pursuant thereto. Yakus, the petitioner, violated a regulation issued on the
price of wholesale beef and was charged with a criminal violation of the
statute. Having failed to utilize the available administrative procedure to
challenge the regulation, he was prevented from raising the issue of the
regulation's validity when tried in the district court. The Court held Yakus
was not deprived of his fifth amendment due process rights because judicial
review was available to test the regulation's validity and Congress had the
right to provide exclusive jurisdiction in the Emergency Court of Appeals for
such purpose.' 3 7 In failing to utilize the constitutional procedures established, Yakus was held to have waived his right to challenge the regulation.
Justice Rutledge, dissenting, argued that Congress could not grant the
district courts jurisdiction over enforcement proceedings and then direct the
manner in which the jurisdiction was to be exercised; 3 8 to permit such a
restriction would result in the courts' being required to enforce unconstitutional laws. 1 39 He noted that the majority's position was predicated upon
the right to review in the Emergency Court of Appeals, and agreed that
Congress could not deprive all courts of the ability to review the validity of
the order. 140 However, the thrust of the dissent's argument was the
contention that the right to protest the regulations administratively and in the
Emergency Court of Appeals was ineffectual,' 4' and, therefore, constituted
a denial of due process.
In Willingham the Office of Price Administration issued an order reducing
the rents which Willingham could collect due to the location of the apart133.

321 U.S. 414 (1944).

134. 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
135. Ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23, as amended, ch. 578, 56 Stat. 765 (1942).
136. Emergency Price Control Act, ch. 26, §§ 204(c), (d), 56 Stat. 32, as amended,
ch. 578, 56 Stat. 765 (1942).
137.

321 U.S. 414 (1944).

141.

321 U.S. at 437-47.

138. Id. at 468 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 470, 484.
140. Id. at 447, 469; see Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of
FederalCourts: An Exercise in Dialectic,66 HARv. L. REv. 1362 (1953).
"Both are short-cut proceedings, trimmed almost to the

bone of due process, even for wholly civil purposes, and pared down even further by
a short statute of limitations." Id. at 474. The protest was required to be filed in 60
days or the right was waived. The protestant was restricted to the submission of written
evidence, there was no right of cross-examination, and most significantly, the regulation
and orders could not be stayed.
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ments in specified defense areas. 142 The appellee filed a protest with the
OPA, but pursuant to statutory authority the Administrator issued an order
reducing the rent, thereby making the order subject to challenge in the
Emergency Court of Appeals. 143 The Court held that judicial review subsequent to the issuance of the order satisfied the fifth amendment due process
1 44
clause despite the lack of stay pending the outcome of the litigation.
Justice Rutledge, concurring, accepted the majority's position because this
was a civil rather than a criminal proceeding as was Yakus. He expressed
the view, however, that there are three limitations on such a holding: (1)
the order or regulation may not be patently invalid; (2) the previous
opportunity to initiate a challenge administratively must be constitutionally
adequate; and (3) the circumstances and1 45nature of the problem must justify
the special remedy and its exclusiveness. '
Yakus and Willingham appear to control the application of the FTCIA. If
the non-party subject to the cease and desist order is given no opportunity
administratively and judicially to test the validity of the order, then these
decisions suggest the constitutional invalidity of the statute.'14 However,
should the non-party be permitted to intervene in the administrative process
with rights equal to the respondent, then sufficient opportunity is provided to
challenge the order administratively. Under Yakus, therefore, the statute
would be valid. While Justice Rutledge's dissent in Yakus is technically
distinguishable from the present situation due to the civil nature of the
FTCIA, the potentially severe penalties under the FTCIA may warrant
application of his rationale with a resulting conclusion of unconstitutionality.
There appears to be little doubt that his concurrence in Willingham suggests
the FTCIA is unacceptable. The special wartime circumstances supporting
the enactment of the Emergency Price Control Act are absent when considering the FTCIA. Therefore, even if the full right of intervention at the
outset of an administrative proceeding were granted, the statute would be
inadequate under his view. Conceivably, anything less than a full right of
intervention would also invalidate the statute. This is not to say, however,
that the majority of the courts which decided Yakus and Willingham would
accept the FTCIA in any event, for the nature of war affects the decisions of
courts on subjects directly related to the war effort. 14
Commission Orders as "Statutory Enactments." The Commission may
attempt to suggest that the discussion of the adequacy of representation and
notice and the restriction of judicial review is irrelevant since Congress has
142. Id. at 508.
143. Id. at 509-10.
144. Id. at 520. Quoting Justice Brandeis in Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S.
589, 596-97 (1931), the Court stated: "'Where only property rights are involved, mere
postponement of the judicial enquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity
given for the ultimate judicial determination of liability is adequate. . . . Delay in the
judicial determination of property rights is not uncommon where it is essential that governmental needs be immediately satisfied.'" 321 U.S. at 520.
145. 321 U.S. at 526 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
146. See note 141 supra. See also H. HART, H. WECHSLER, P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN
& D. SHAPIRO, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 309-72 (2d ed. 1973).
147. See generally T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 55-95

(1970).
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"enacted into law the standards of commercial conduct which the Commission has developed .... 14 This point is well taken with respect to
decisions of the Commission prior to the passage of the FTCIA because
Congress has the right to enact definitions for "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices." However, as Chairman Engman notes, the statute only appears
to have enacted these decisions.1 49 Whether the Chairman's dubious
conclusion is valid is yet to be determined. More explicit statutory language
to indicate the validity of this assertion would have been desirable. 15 0
Should the court accept the Commission's position, cease and desist orders
obtained through both formal adjudication and consent negotiations prior to
the enactment of the FTCIA would be applicable standards in later civil
penalty suits. The problems of adequate representation and notice would
not apply to these decisions since they would assume the character of
"statutory definitions."
One problem which should be considered is whether and to what extent
these decisions, which are arguably "statutory definitions," can be expanded
by future orders. If these "definitions" are permitted to be expanded, the
original "statutory" language would conceivably cease to resemble the
expanded version. While Congress, as representative of the people, may
enact legislation, the Commission is not representative in the same fashion
when fulfilling its adjudicatory functions. Members of the Commission are
one step removed from popular control. Although this status is essential to
preserve the integrity of independent regulation from interference by parti-

san political groups, effective control of the Commission by citizen voters,
including the consumers who are the objects of the Commission's labors, is
less direct than that held over Congress. Naturally, the "legislation" enacted
by the Commission is predicated upon one instance of deceptive practice
determined in an adjudicatory atmosphere, not in a rule-making proceed52
ing'1 with all interested parties having an opportunity to be heard.'
IV.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE DUE PROCESS PROBLEMS

Two potential solutions to the due process problems raised by an interpretation of the FTCIA which precludes judicial determination of the nature of
unfair or deceptive acts or practices are: (1) intervention by potential
148. Engman Address, supra note 81.
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. See TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(c) (Supp. 1975-76) which pro-

vides: "It is the intent of the legislature that in construing .. .this section the courts
to the extent possible will be guided by . . . the interpretations given by the Federal

Trade Commission and federal courts to Section 5(a) (1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act [15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(1)]." The Commission appears to recognize the fallacy
of this argument since the Commission has begun a program to codify former adjudicated orders into rules under its rulemaking authority. FTC News No. L035-CODE
(Dec. 30, 1975).
151. The provisions governing rulemaking by the FTC are set out in 15 U.S.C. §
57a (Supp. IV, 1974) and 40 Fed. Reg. 33966-70 (1975), amending 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.11.20 (1975).
152. For a general discussion of the distinction between rulemaking and adjudication see Burrus & Teter, Antitrust: Rulemaking v. Adjudication in the FTC, 54 GEO.
L.J. 1106 (1966).
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defendants in the administrative cease and desist proceeding; and (2) the
use of collateral attack on the Commission's order, particularly in the form of
a declaratory judgment action, to cure the lack of judicial review in an
enforcement proceeding.
Intervention. Intervention into a Commission proceeding is governed 1by
54
1 3
and section 3.14 of the Commission's rules
section 5(b) of the FTCA'
which require under the statutory standard a showing of good cause. The
criteria announced in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.' 55 for demonstrating
good cause are: (1) the raising of substantial issues of law or fact which
would not otherwise be properly raised or argued; (2) the significance of these
issues such that the Commission's additional expenditure of limited resources
for the longer, more complicated proceeding is warranted; (3) the ability of
the applicant to contribute to the case; (4) the need to expedite the case; and
(5) the potential resulting prejudice to the rights of the named respondent. 156 The Commission notes, however, that satisfaction of these criteria
will not automatically result in permission to intervene; the Commission
retains the discretion to deny intervention in any case.'5 7 The Commission
may determine, for example, not to permit intervention in a consent
proceeding since such intervention might frustrate the attempt to obtain an
order. This may be justified by the fact that an opportunity for public
comment is provided.' 58 In Action on Safety & Health v. FTC159 the
District of Columbia Circuit held that such a determination was within the
discretion of the agency and, therefore, exempt from judicial review under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).' 60 This decision was rendered
prior to the enactment of the EFTCIA. Hence, the Commission's stated
justification and the court's holding should be scrutinized carefully in light of
the FTCIA and the due process problems it raises, especially since public
comment rarely results in any change.' 6 '
In the event intervention is granted the statute and the rule do not
automatically grant the intervenor all of the rights conferred on the respondent. 1 62 In Campbell Soup Co.' 63 Students Opposing Unfair Practices, Inc.
(SOUP) was permitted to intervene only to the extent of submitting written
153. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (Supp. IV, 1974): "Any person, partnership, or corporation
may make application, and upon good cause shown may be allowed by the Commission
to intervene and appear in said proceeding by counsel or in person."
154. 16 C.F.R. § 3.14 (1975). See generally Note, Federal Agency Assistance to
Impecunious Intervenors, 88 HARV. L REv. 1815 (1975).
155. [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 19,373 (FTC 1970).
156. Id. at 21,501, 21,502.
157. Id. at 21,501. See Standard Sewing Equip. Corp., 4 Ad. L.2d 382 (FTC
1954) (denying intervention when the intervenor favored the Commission position);
MacIntyre & Volhard, supra note 23, at 253.
158. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
159. 34 Ad. L.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see MacIntyre & Volhard, supra note 23,

at 250.

160. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970); see 34 Ad. L.2d at 691.

161. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.

162. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REv. 721, 727 (1968); see The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258
(1924).
163. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TR"E REG. REP. 19,261 (FTC 1970).
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briefs, while in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.' 64 the Commission's grant of
intervention extended to presenting non-repetitive relevant evidence, the
filing of briefs on this evidence, and discovery rights regarding such evidence. a15
While in the past the Commisssion has had the authority to restrict the
rights of intervenors at its discretion, under the FTCIA this discretionary
authority may be held not to exist, or at least to be limited. If the presence
of the right to intervene is relied upon to remove due process problems
created by the statutory procedures, the FTC should certainly have no
discretionary authority to deny intervention to potential litigants adverse to
its petition. This answer, however, still does not resolve the issue of whether
the Commission's discretionary authority concerning the extent of intervention must also be withdrawn. At first blush it seems that FTC discretion
over the nature and amount of intervention must also be curbed in order for
intervenors to protect their rights adequately. Further consideration of this
issue suggests that the Commission and the courts may balance the interests
of the parties in each case and determine that some degree less than the full
extent of intervention satisfies due process. One possible justification for
such an approach is the pragmatic concern that every potential defendant in
a penalty action may attempt to intervene in the administrative proceeding to
protect its interest. In this situation the cease and desist order proceeding
would become a Pandora's box; a proceeding essentially in the nature of
rule-making would result, although governed by adjudicatory rules. Little
imagination is required to suggest the unmanageability of such a proceeding.
Aside from the question of the rights of intervenors during the initial
administrative hearing, problems exist concerning the right of the intervenor
to appeal an adverse administrative law judge's decision. Appeal to the
Commission is governed by Commission rule 3.52(a) 6 6 which restricts the
right of appeal to parties, and rule 3.14(c) 16 7 which suggests an intervenor
is not a party.' 6 8 While these sections lend credence to the conclusion that
an intervenor may not appeal as a matter of right, Chief Judge Friendly
states in Pepsico, Inc. v. FTC 69 that the Commission would "withhold such
a right at its peril" when property rights are at stake.' 7 0 Should the
Commission fail to heed this warning, the intervenor may successfully raise
the failure of the administrative procedures to assure adequate representation. 171
164. [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 19,373 (FTC 1970).
165. Id.; see Kennecott Copper Corp. [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
19,281 (FTC 1970).
166. 16 C.F.R. § 3.52(a) (1975).
167. Id. § 3.41(c).
168. See Pepsico, Inc. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
876 (1973). In Pepsico, Chief Judge Friendly finds rule 3.41(c) ambiguous. Id. at
184.
169. Id. at 179.
170. Id. at 184 & n.4, citing 14 C.F.R. §§ 302.14(b), .15 (1975) (Civil Aeronautics
Board) and 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.223, .225 (1975) (Federal Communications Commission)
as examples of rules distinguishing between those individuals with a property interest
at stake and, therefore, entitled to all the rights of a party, and those persons with a
more generalized interest whose participation can be restricted.
171. See notes 110-18 supra and accompanying text.
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The intervenor's second problem concerns the ability to appeal from an
adverse Commission determination to the court of appeals. Prior to the
FTCIA the courts did not find that standing to intervene automatically
conferred standing to obtain judicial review of an adverse Commission
decision; only those required to cease and desist from engaging in a practice
were permitted to perfect an appeal. 1 72 The question presented is whether
an intervenor, as a potential defendant in a civil penalty action under the
FTCIA, fits within the scope of this requirement. The intervenor may
contend that permission to intervene with full rights equal to those of the
named respondent was given by the Commission during the administrative
cease and desist order proceeding to assure adequate representation. 17 ' In
essence, therefore, to fulfill this purpose the intervenor was made a party to
the action; he will be bound by the decision, and must necessarily have the
right to appeal. In the alternative, the intervenor may assert that the
potential imposition of penalties against non-parties pursuant to the FTCLA
requires the non-parties to cease and desist from engaging in a practice
despite the fact that the complaint was issued against someone else and the
intervenor was not technically a party to the proceeding. Although not
named as a party because of these consequences, the intervenor meets the
requirements of standing to seek judicial review, and individual review
should be granted for full protection of intervenor's rights.
The Commission may take issue with these assertions by contending that
174
the Commission's rules do not explicitly make an intervenor a "party,"'
and since only parties are permitted to perfect an appeal, the intervenor
1 75
should not be permitted to appeal. Even if the two premises are correct,
the conclusion that follows is not necessarily valid. The failure of the
intervenor to be a technical party bound by the decision under the theory of
res judicata, which would appear to confer a right to appeal, is not
dispositive of the right to take an appeal. In Atlantic Refining Co. v.
Standard Oil Co.176 the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected a test based on the applicability of res judicata for determining who
would be subject to an order. The court adopted a test which relies on a
determination of whether a decision will effectively preclude the ability to
seek redress. Under the restrictive interpretation of the FTCIA177 the
intervenor-potential defendant in a civil penalty action may be precluded
from later obtaining a review of the Commission's conclusions of law.
Therefore, the intervenor's right to redress will be effectively denied; the
172. Consumer Fed'n of America v. FTC, 515 F.2d 367 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See also
Maclntyre & Volhard, supra note 23, at 240-42.
173. See notes 110-18 supra and accompanying text.
174. See notes 166-68 supra and accompanying text.
175. See Pepsico, Inc. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
876 (1973). The court stated in part, "The notion that being a 'party' before an agency
• ..is a necessary condition of the right to judicial review has in fact been dead since
Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry. v. United States, 281 U.S. 479, 486 [1930] . . .although courts
have not always appreciated this." Id. at 186.
176. 304 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1962); accord, Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair
Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 281-84 (1946); International Mortgage & Inv. Corp. v. Von
Clemm, 301 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1962).
177. See notes 86-90 supra and accompanying text.
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intervenor will be subject to the order and will thereby satisfy the requirement for standing established in Consumer Federation of America v.
78
FTC.
Should the courts deny the right of appeal to an intervenor, under the
restrictive interpretation of the FTCIA the problem of adequate representation remains unresolved. The named respondent in a Commission cease and
desist proceeding may decide not to pursue his right to appeal, thereby
leaving the potential defendant in a position similar to the non-named
members of the class in Gonzales v. Cassidy.179
Declaratory Relief. A second possible solution to due process problems
raised by the FTCIA is the availability of declaratory relief to individuals
engaging in acts or practices within the scope of an existing cease and desist
order. For such individuals a declaratory judgment action begun prior to
the institution of a civil penalty suit could provide an opportunity to obtain a
full and adequate hearing on whether the acts and practices which are the
subject of a cease and desist order are indeed unfair or deceptive.
In Pepsico, Inc. v. FTC8 0 Chief Judge Friendly suggested that "review
would be available" to the intervenor in the district court pursuant to section
702 of the APA if the intervenor were denied the right of appeal and the
respondent failed to appeal an adverse Commission decision, thereby being
precluded from intervening at the appellate level pursuant to rule 15(d) of
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.' 8 ' Although this suggestion
concerned persons who did intervene, to extend this "option" to those who
were denied intervention would not appear unreasonable. To extend this
suggestion to those who failed to intervene could result in claims of waiver
by the Commission. Such a defense is objectionable, however, in light of the
discretionary nature of the Commission's power to deny intervention.
If this suggested approach is still applicable in light of the FTCIA, 18 2 the
denial of due process to defendants unable to obtain an administrative
hearing and not parties to the original cease and desist proceeding could be
negated by providing subsequent judicial review.' 8 3 There is precedent for
178. 515 F.2d 367 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
179. 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973); see notes 110-97 supra and accompanying text.
180. 472 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876 (1973). The FTC
sought to prevent Pepsico from allegedly hindering competition by restricting the geographic area in which the bottlers could distribute Pepsico's syrups and soft drink products. The bottlers and their association intervened in the administrative proceeding to
protect their interest in the exclusive contracts by alleging Pepsico's inability to represent the bottlers' interests adequately. This action arose in federal district court when
Pepsico sought to enjoin further Commission proceedings until all of the bottlers were
joined as parties to the administrative proceeding. Id. at 183. Pepsico alleged that
a failure to join all of the bottlers would subject it to liability by an unjoined bottler
whose territory had been invaded. Id. at 187. The intervenor bottlers alleged that they
also might be held liable for selling the soft drink or syrups in the territory of an unjoined bottler. Id. The court discussed the intervenors' rights to review because the
intervenors had an interest which Pepsico could not adequately represent.
181. Id. at 185-86. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970) provides: "A person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."
182. See notes 199-206 infra and accompanying text.
183. K. DAvIs, supra note 46, § 7.10.
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such review in the assertion of jurisdiction by federal district courts of actions
seeking declaratory and other relief from agency determinations pursuant to
185
the APA 8 4 and Declaratory Judgment Acts.
Significant obstacles to obtaining declaratory relief are the need for
1' 86
standing and the constitutional requirement of a "case or controversy.'
In Brandenfels v. Day' 8 7 the court determined that no case or controversy was
presented when the 'TC had taken no action against the plaintiff other than
to initiate an investigation, and the nature of the charges, which might never
be filed, were speculative. Similarly, a Delaware district court denied a
manufacturer's request for a stay of statutory penalties for violation of a cease
and desist order since the Commission had not made a decision as to whether
the order had been violated.' 8
A justiciable case or controversy is presented and declaratory relief is
appropriate upon a showing that the potential defendant is bound by a
particular order or that Commission action poses an actual or threatened
interference with the potential defendant's rights. 189 Under the FTCIA
Commission action should satisfy the requirement of a case or controversy if
notice of the previous order is served on the potential defendant, 190 because
the potential defendant in such a case can assume that a penalty action will
be initiated. In addition, the Commission in these circumstances has
probably taken affirmative action toward establishing proof of a violation,
and the nature of the charge-that the potential defendant had violated the
previously entered order-is clear.
The requirement of standing should be satisfied if the standards established in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner'91 are fulfilled. There the Court
found that the plaintiff had standing to challenge administrative action if (1)
the order was directed to the plaintiff, (2) the order required changes in the
everyday business practice of the plaintiff, and (3) failure by the plaintiff to
92
comply with the order would result in clear exposure to strong sanctions.'
Under the FTCIA the cease and desist order previously issued is directed to
everyone who may engage in the same practice. If the potential defendant
is required to alter advertising or some other practice, the alteration will
clearly have an effect on the everyday business practice of the plaintiff, and
failure to comply with the previously entered order will subject the potential
defendant to a civil penalty action. Consequently, the elements of standing
184. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970); see, e.g., Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503
(1944). For a discussion of Willingham see notes 142-45 supra and accompanying text.
185. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970); see note 39 supra.
186. For a detailed discussion of the cases and theory on the problems of standing
and the need for a case or controversy see K. DAVIS, supra note 46, §§ 22.01-.18, and
G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1544-93 (9th ed. 1975).
187. 316 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 824 (1963).
188. Continental Baking Co. v. Dixon, 283 F. Supp. 285 (D. Del. 1968). See also
FTC v. Nash-Finch Co., 288 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Helco Prod. Co. v. McNutt,
137 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
189. See cases cited note 188 supra.
190. See note 79 supra.
191. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
192. Id. at 154.
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stated in Abbott Laboratories are met in the situation presented by the
FTCIA.
If an enterprise is aware of the previous order but there is no indication that
the Commission is aware of its engaging in the practice, the party still may
desire to seek relief by declaratory judgment. The tactical hazard of alerting
the Commission may be outweighed by "striking first" before the Commission is fully prepared to bring a penalty action. Needless to say, it would
seem that this opportunity should not be taken unless the enterprise is certain
the Commission will eventually take action. Of course, if Commission
action is not imminent, the declaratory judgment procedure may not be
available. Actual knowledge of a prior cease and desist order is evident
from the filing of the complaint in the declaratory judgment action, and it is
improbable that the Commission would assert that it had no intention to
collect penalties in such a case. 193 Therefore, it is clear that a dispute
under the FTCIA is present and even likely to occur; the requirements for
19 4
establishing a case or controversy are apparently satisfied.
Courts have indicated that judicial interference in this type of situation is
not warranted unless the order issued would be invalid as a result of the prior
proceedings, and statutory review is inadequate.' 95 Absent full rights upon
intervention, statutory review appears inadequate due to the lack of adequate representation and notice. 196 To show the invalidity of the order, a
patent violation of statutory or constitutional rights must be proved. 197 In
this instance the lack of adequate representation or notice, or both, and the
resulting constitutional deficiency of such proceedings' 98 may be a sufficiently
clear violation of constititional rights so that justification exists for judicial
intervention through the vehicle of declaratory judgment.
Assuming that the constitutional "standing" and "case or controversy"
hurdles are crossed, questions of statutory interpretation must still be addressed in seeking declaratory relief. The most significant issue concerning
the use of sections 702199 and 703200 of the APA to obtain declaratory
193. Full enforcement of the statute would seem to require that the FTC seek to collect civil penalties unless potential defendants' acts or practices were not in the Commission's judgment within the scope of the previously entered cease and desist order.
194. See notes 186-88 supra and accompanying text.
195. Knoll Associates, Inc. v. Dixon, 232 F. Supp. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). See also
R.H. Macy & Co. v. Tinley, 249 F. Supp. 778, 782 (D.D.C. 1965).
196. See notes 110-31 supra and accompanying text.
197. St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1961) (dictum);
Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v. FTC, 291 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Va.), afl'd, 416 F.2d
971 (4th Cir. 1968); Seeburg Corp. v. FTC, 1966 Trade Cas.
71,955 (E.D. Tenn.
1966). Compare Jewel Cos. v. FTC, 432 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1970), with Maremont
Corp. v. FTC, 431 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1970).
198. See notes 110-52 supra and accompanying text.
199. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). This section provides, "A person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."
200. 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1970):
The form of proceeding for judicial review is the special statutory review
proceeding relevant to the subject matter in a court specified by statute or,

in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action,

including actions for declaratory judgments or writs or prohibitory or
mandatory injunction or habeas corpus, in a court of competent jurisdiction. Except to the extent that prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity
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relief is whether the language or intent of the FTCIA precludes application
of these sections. The APA has general application in reviewing administrative action "except to the extent that . . . statutes preclude judicial review
.
,,201 If the applicable statute does not explicitly preclude judicial
review, the Supreme Court has held that clear and convincing evidence of a
congressional intent to deprive the courts of review must be discerned from
202
the entire legislative scheme.
The opponents of employing the APA when the FTCIA has been invoked
may contend that statutory language providing for the finality of Commission
orders 203 indicates a congressional intent to preclude application of the
APA. However, in Brownell v. Tom We Shung20 4 the Supreme Court held
statutory language on the finality of administrative orders referred only to
administrative finality and not to the applicability of the APA. The finality
language of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 was similar to the
FTCA provision on the finality of Commission orders and the principle
stated in Tom We Shung would apparently allow resort to the APA for
judicial review of Commission orders. Moreover, language on the finality of
FTC orders was apparently included to expedite enforcement of the FTCA
20 5
by eliminating the need to obtain an enforcement order.
In an attempt to preclude the use of a declaratory judgment action, the
Commission may argue that use of the APA in this manner frustrates the
intent of the legislation20 6 since the FTCIA is intended to accelerate
enforcement of the FTCA by eliminating the need to litigate the issues
administratively more than one time. To permit the potential defendant to
seek declaratory relief may retard the desired speed of enforcement. Recognition should be given to the fact that the declaratory action may, in the long
run, actually speed up the process if this action can be conducted as a
plaintiffs' class action and -the problems of notice and adequate representation can be resolved.
The use of a declaratory judgment action to test the validity of a
Commission order issued in light of the FTCIA is a matter of necessity. This
action appears to provide the most suitable means to test the validity of a
cease and desist order. While the courts must make the determination as to
whether the language of the APA is sufficiently flexible to permit this type of
action, a restrictive interpretation of the APA renders the FTCIA very
vulnerable.

for judicial review is provided by law, agency action is subject to judicial
review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial enforcement.
201.

5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970).

202. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organization, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
203. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
204. 352 U.S. 180, 181 (1956) (Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 242(b),
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1970)); see L. JAFFE, supra note 50, at 372, 376. But see Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506 (1916) (decision of the Secretary of the Interior was
non-reviewable regarding determination of the heir of a deceased Indian).
205. See notes 61-67 supra and accompanying text.
206. See notes 81-90 supra and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

The Federal Trade Commission has been given the difficult task of
ensuring that unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices are prevented. Congress has attempted to provide the Commission
with powerful tools to obtain compliance with the FTCA in a speedy, yet
fair, manner. Through the use of informal and formal proceedings the
Commission may issue broadly worded orders to preclude unlawful practices.
To provide the necessary coercion to act lawfully the FTCA permits the
Commission to institute suits for civil penalties against those persons violating
Commission orders. Passage of the FTCIA indicates a congressional desire
to expedite enforcement of the FTCA. The FTCIA creates the equivalent
of a defendants' class action and permits the offensive use of collateral
estoppel by permitting a cease and desist order to become the basis for a civil
penalty action despite the fact that the defendant was not named in the
original order. In an attempt to clarify the defendant's rights in such a civil
penalty suit Congress has clouded the application of the statute by allowing a
trial de novo on issues of fact in the civil penalty proceeding.
The statutory language providing for trial de novo may be interpreted to
permit the district court to make its own determination on fact and law,
although such an interpretation appears contrary to the scheme of the
legislation. A restrictive interpretation, which permits the district court to
entertain argument only on questions of fact and not conclusions of law,
raises serious problems of due process regarding adequate representation,
adequate notice, and restriction of judicial review. These problems arise,
however, only if the potential defendant is not provided with an opportunity
to intervene early with the full rights of a party in the administrative proceedings. To permit full intervention has serious weaknesses since the number of
intervenors would probably result in a proceeding similar to rule-making. If
the courts reject this approach, an alternative is to permit the potential
defendant to obtain declaratory relief in the district court pursuant to the
APA. This approach, however, is not flawless since application of the APA
is prevented if a statute precludes judicial review. While the FTCIA does
not expressly preclude the use of the APA, the purpose of the legislation
strongly suggests this result.
Congressional clarification of the FTCIA is clearly warranted. Without
such clarification the courts will be required to test the constitutional validity
of the statute with the potential results of (1) severely altering Commission
procedures, (2) altering the expediting purpose of the FTCIA, or (3)
declaring the statute unconstitutional. Since the courts are reticent to find
legislation unconstitutional, either of the first two results, although unintended by Congress, is more likely to occur. Prognostication of judicial action is
hazardous at best, but it seems certain that the validity of this statute will
be heavily litigated.

